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HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND ANALYSIS OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT:
AN OVERVIEW
DAVID S. SHRAGERf
CAROL NELSON SHEPHERDtf
THE PENNSYLVANIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY adopted a
comparative negligence statute 1 which became effective on Sep-
tember 7, 1976.2 The legislation is brief and its general language
leaves numerous issues open to judicial interpretation. Although the
Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act was patterned to some ex-
tent after the comparative negligence statute of Wisconsin, 3 it has no
statutory twin in any other jurisdiction.4
It was early decided that the Act was not to be applicable ret-
roactively, but was to apply only to causes of action accruing on Sep-
tember 7, 1976 or thereafter. 5 Case law interpreting the Act is
therefore just now developing in the Pennsylvania courts.
This article will first trace the development of comparative negli-
gence law in Pennsylvania. It will then analyze the judicial treatment
of some of the issues left unresolved by the Act and several of the
areas which remain to be construed by the courts. In the latter in-
stances, the opposing policy considerations will be set forth along
with the authors' recommendations concerning the rules of law which
should be adopted in Pennsylvania. Finally, some of the practical
considerations and consequences engendered by the Act, for both the
attorney and the litigant, will be discussed. 6
B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1957; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1960.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
f B.A., Arizona State University, 1975; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law, 1978.
Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
The authors express their appreciation to Ellen Mecklenborg, Jon Willinger, and John
Wright for their research assistance.
1. For purposes of this symposium, references to and quotations from the Pennsylvania
Comparative Negligence Act have been made without citation. For the text of the Act, see
Spina, Introduction, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV.
419, 419 (1979).
2. The Act was approved by former Governor Milton Shapp on July 9, 1976. The statute
provided that it would take effect in 60 lays, thereby becoming effective on September 7, 1976.
3. See note 98 infra.
4. See id. See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 337-69 (1974); H. WOODS,
COMPARATIVE FAULT 421-595 (1978).
5. Costa v. Lair, 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 519, 363 A.2d 1313, 1314 (1976) (per curiam). Cf.
Raymond v. Jenard, 390 A.2d 358 (R.I. 1978) (statute held retroactive to cause of action accru-
ing prior to effective date but sued on subsequent thereto).
6. Only § (a) of the Act will be discussed in this article. Section (b), which provides for contri-
bution among joining defendants, is discussed in another article in this symposium. See Griffith,
Hemsley & Burr, Contribution, Indemnity, Settlements, and Releases: What the Pennsylvania
(422)
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I. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In order to understand the Pennsylvania Comparative Negli-
gence Act, it is essential to review the historical background of the
common law doctrine of contributory negligence. Much of the case
law prior to the enactment of comparative negligence statutes was
developed in an attempt to ameliorate the harshness of the impact of
the doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff.
The legal doctrine that culpable conduct by a plaintiff absolves
the defendant of liability actually antedates the concept of negli-
gence. 7 Based upon proximate cause, the doctrine posited that the
plaintiff's act was the proximate cause of his injury.8 His right to
recover was denied not because of his negligence, the notion of which
had not yet arisen, but because his own act was deemed to be the
direct cause of the accident. 9
The doctrine of contributory negligence is generally believed to
have been first enunciated in 1809 in the English case of Butterfield
v. Forrester. 10 It entered American jurisprudence in 1824 through
the Massachusetts case of Smith v. Smith. 11 In Butterfield and
Comparative Negligence Statute Did Not Say, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsyl-
vania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 494 (1979). Certain areas in which the Act has had an impact, including
multiple defendants, jury, and verdict, are discussed in greater depth in another article. See
Beasley & Tunstall, Jury Instructions Concerning Multiple Defendants and Strict Liability After
the Pennsylvania Negligence Act, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24
VILL. L. REv. 518 (1979).
7. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:2, at 4.
8. Id.
9. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (pt. 1), 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 196
(1950). Pollock, the nineteenth century authority on torts, considered proximate cause to be the
true basis of contributory negligence. F. POLLOCK, LAW OF TORTS 366-68 (14th ed. 1939). He
stated that the plaintiff's recovery should not be barred unless his negligence occurred at the
final stage, or at a decisive point, and was more proximate than the defendant's negligence in
causing the accident or injury. Id. at 367. It was not until the early years of the twentieth
century that the emphasis on proximate cause came into question. H. WOODS, supra note 4,
§ 1:2, at 6.
10. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). In Butterfield, the plaintiff, who was riding
upon a public road, was injured when he ran into a pole which the defendant had left across the
highway. Id. at 60, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926-27. Evidence was introduced which proved that the
plaintiff could have avoided the pole if he had been riding slower or had maintained a better
lookout. Id., 103 Eng. Rep. at 927. The court held that
[a] party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has been made by the fault
of another, and avail himself of it, if he do [sic] not himself use common and ordinary
caution to be in the right .... One person being in fault will not dispense with another's
using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an
obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to
avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.
Id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
11. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). In Smith, the plaintiff's horse was injured by defendant's
woodpile which projected into the highway. Id. at 621. The court specifically cited Butterfield
in holding that the plaintiff could not recover unless he could show that he had used ordinary
care. Id. at 624.
2
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Smith, the doctrine of contributory negligence was greatly expanded
as the courts adopted the test of lack of ordinary care, without requir-
ing proximate cause. 12 Where plaintiff's lack of ordinary care, no
matter how slight, contributed to his injury, he was completely
barred from obtaining recovery against the defendant. 13 The doctrine
"reflected a desire to protect an emerging yet weak industrial
economy fi-om catastrophic tort losses." 14 Broad philosophical bases
such a laissez-faire, free will, and individualism were asserted. 15
The rule was also justified by the assertion that it encouraged every
member of the commutnity to maintain a certain standard of care, 16
since a person who did not exercise ordinary care for his own safety
was punished by an inability to recover for his injuries.17
Professors Harper and James have stated that "almost from the
very beginning there has been serious dissatisfaction with the Draco-
nian rule sired by a medieval concept of cause out of a heartless
laissez-faire." 18 By the twentieth century, the doctrine was under
12. See H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:3, at 7. Discussing Butterfield and Smith, Woods
states:
No attempt was made to measure the degree of plaintiff's contribution. The defense was
applicable whether or not plaintiff's negligence made a substantial or material contribu-
tion to his injury. A plaintiff who contributed even slightly to his own injury could not
recover regardless of how negligent the defendant may have been, and in some jurisdic-
tions the plaintiff was required to plead and prove absence of negligence on his part.
Id. (footnote omitted).
13. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809); An-
'not., 32 A.L.R.3d 463, 468-69 (1970).
14. Comment, The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act: The Fifty-One Percent Solu-
tion, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 354 n.14 (1977). See also Comment, Torts-Comparative
Negligence-Good or Ill for Missouri, 30 Mo. L. RzE'. 137, 138 (1965).
15. See H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:4, at 9.
In the nineteenth century . . . Law was a realization of the idea of liberty, and existed to
bring about the widest possible individual liberty. Liberty was the free will in action.
Hence it was the business of the legal order to give the widest effect to the declared will
and to impose no duties except in order to effectuate the will or to reconcile the will of
one with the will of others by a universal law . . . the bases of liability were culpable
conduct and legal transaction, and these came down to an ultimate basis in will. The
fundamental conception in legal liability was the conception of an act-of a manifestation
of the will in the external world.
Id. (footnote omitted), quoting R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE
LAW 79-80 (1921).
16, See Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARv. L. REv. 233, 254-55 (1908). This com-
mentator explained:
The duty of care for others manifestly should be no higher than the duty of self-
protection. To hold otherwise would be to unduly burden business and enterprise, to
make of those engaged therein the guardians of those apt to be affected by their opera-
tion, and at the same time to rob of self-reliance, and so enervate and emasculate and in
effect pauperize the latter by accustoming them to look to others for protection and by
removing from them all responsibility for their own safety.
Id. See also Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARv. L. REV.
263, 267-69 (1890).
17. F. POLLOCK, supra note 9, at 367.
18. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.3, at 1207 (1956) (footnote omit-
[VOL. 24: p. 422
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heavy assault by both the bench 19 and by legal scholars. 20 It has
been called "the harshest doctrine known to the common law of the
nineteenth century." 21
The rigid application of contributory negligence inevitably pro-
duced inequitable results in many cases. By the close of the
nineteenth century, significant limitations 22 had been engrafted upon
19. In 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion written by Justice
Black, characterized contributory negligence as "a discredited doctrine which automatically de-
stroys all claims of injured persons who have contributed to their injuries in any degree, how-
ever slight." Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953). Many additional state and
federal court opinions have criticized the doctrine. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 809-13, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 862-64 (1975); Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700, 737-38 (1886); Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-30,
281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
20. Professor Turk, in his seminal article, Comparative Negligence on the March, eloquently
criticized the contributory negligence doctrine:
All human beings, because of their imperfections, are what the law would style "negli-
gent" at some time or another; the one today, the other tomorrow. Why then, if an
accident results from the negligence of two or more persons, should the noxal conse-
quences be distributed so unevenly? Why should the mutilated victim have to suffer the
sorrows of pain, tears, and sleepless nights while his opponent, perhaps guilty of fault to a
higher degree, is free to leave a court of justice bearing a certificate that he is not to be
deemed a tort-feasor? To call such a result "harsh" is to use a mild expression, to say the
least!
Turk, supra note 9, at 201-02.
Dean Prosser was also a vociferous critic of contributory negligence, arguing that it is no
answer to the harshness of the rule to contend that it will promote caution by making the
plaintiff responsible for his own safety. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971).
Dean Prosser stated:
It is quite as reasonable to say that it encourages negligence, by giving the defendant
reason to hope that he will escape the consequences .... No one supposes that an au-
tomobile driver, as he approaches an intersection, is in fact meditating upon the golden
mean of the reasonable man of ordinary prudence, and the possibility of tort damages,
whether for himself or for another.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Mole
& Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence (pts. 1 & 2), 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604 (1932);
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MiCH. L. REV. 465 (1953); Woods, The New Kansas Com-
parative Negligence Act-An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1975).
21. Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 36 (1944).
22. Professor Thomas Lambert has listed the limits on contributory negligence as follows:
(1) The defense is not available in an action based upon intentional or reckless
wrongdoing....
(2) Contributory negligence is generally not a defense where defendant engages in
ultrahazardous or extrahazardous activities giving rise to strict liability....
(3) In general, although the question is complicated by the amorphous and protean
nature of the concept of nuisance, contributory negligence is insignificant as a defense in
such cases, especially in cases of absolute nuisance ...
(4) Contributory negligence is not a defense in strict privity-free tort or warranty
products liability cases where the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure to
discover the danger in the product or to take precautions against its possible exis-
tence. ...
(5) Limitation to specific risk, i.e., plaintiff's contributory negligence is no bar unless
it contributes to the "specific foreseeable risk" which harms plaintiff and which anteced-
ently made defendant's conduct negligent. ...
(6) Contributory negligence is no bar unless plaintiff has exposed himself to an unjus-
tifiable or unreasonable risk of harm. ...
4
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the doctrine in order to ameliorate its harshness. 23  There was also a
decided trend to leave the determination of the existence of con-
tributory negligence to the jury.24  Although the limitations on the
applicability of contributory negligence may have served their pur-
pose at the time, the question of their continued viability following
the enactment of comparative negligence statutes has been a source
of considerable controversy. 25
II. THE STANDARD FOR CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Proximate Cause Requirement
Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in 1976,
Pennsylvania followed a unique standard for contributory negli-
gence.2 6 In Crane v. Neal,2 7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the test for contributory negligence in Pennsylvania was
whether the plaintiff's "negligence contributed in any degree, how-
ever slight, to the injury." 28  The court held that it was error for the
(7) While, in general, contributory negligence is a defense to a negligence action
founded on defendant's violation of a purely criminal statute it will not be where the
statute is "enacted to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise self-
protective care" against the risks created by the statute's violation....
(8) Professor Fleming James, Jr. has persuasively argued that the courts have
adopted a double standard, in comparing such elastic concepts as negligence and con-
tributory negligence, so as to extend the concept of negligence and contract that of con-
tributory negligence ...
(9) The largest and most significant inroad on the indefensible contributory negli-
gence defense is found in the last clear chance doctrine ...
(10) The sharpest and most rational inroad on the harsh contributory negligence de-
fense . . . is the admirable doctrine of comparative negligence.
Lambert, The Common Law Is Never Finished (Comparative Negligence on the March), 32 J.
AM. TRIAL LAW. A. 741, 743-60 (1968) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted), quoting Koenig v.
Patrick Constr.Co., 298 N.Y. 313, 317, 83 N.E.2d 133, 134 (1948), quoting RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 483 (1934).
23. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:6, at 11-12.
24. Id.
25. For a discussion of the effect of comparative negligence on the limiting principles pro-
mulgated under contributory negligence in Pennsylvania, see notes 103-70 and accompanying text
infra.
26. See 3 VILL. L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1958).
27. 389 Pa. 329, 132 A.2d 675 (1957). In Crane, two motorcyclist-plaintiffs stopped on the
paved partition of a highway when one of their motorcycles stalled. Id. at 330, 132 A.2d at 676.
They were subsequently struck by defendant's automobile. id. The defendant's defense was that
plaintiff's failure to remove their motorcycles from the highway amounted to contributory negli-
gence. Id. at 331, 132 A.2d at 677. Although the trial court found for the plaintiffs, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania reversed. Id. at 331-32, 132 A.2d at 677.
28. Id. at 333, 132 A.2d at 677 (footnote omitted), quoting McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa.
543, 546, 79 A.2d 232, 234 (1951) (citations omitted).
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lower court to instruct the jury that plaintiff's negligence must be a
proximate cause of the injury in order to bar the plaintiff's recov-
ery.29 Applied literally, the Crane rule would mandate a verdict for
the defendant whenever a plaintiff's negligence contributed to the
injury in a "but for" sense, even though it was not a "proximate
cause" of the injury.
Although the federal courts in Pennsylvania often applied Crane
literally, 30 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in Moore v. United States,31 held that although a plain-
tiff could not recover if his negligence contributed in any degree to
his injury or death, negligence contributes to the occurrence only if it
is a "juridical" cause of the injury, not simply a condition of its oc-
currence. 32 In another federal case, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, although reciting the rule of
Crane, obviated its harshness by giving the jury wide discretion on
the issue of contributory negligence. 33
It is hardly surprising that the courts in Pennsylvania struggled
to apply the Crane rule in a way that would not contradict traditional
tort concepts of causation. In 1966, without expressly overruling
Crane, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania added a proximate cause
requirement in Hamilton v. Fean.34 This holding did not, however,
dissipate the confusion. Certain lower courts continued to apply liter-
29. 389 Pa. at 332, 132 A.2d at 677.
30. See Musi v. DeSarro, 370 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam). In Musi, plaintiffs
brought suit for personal injuries and property damage which resulted from an automobile acci-
dent. Id. at 114. The plaintiffs admittedly had driven through a flashing red light and the
defendants had driven through a flashing yellow light without decelerating or looking. Id. The
issue was whether the defendant, in his counterclaim against the plaintiffs, was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the defendant was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law since,
by failing to look before entering the intersection, "his negligence contributed in any degree,
however slight, to the injury." Id., quoting Crane v. Neal, 389 Pa. 329, 333, 132 A.2d 675, 677
(1957), quoting McDonald v. Ferrebee, 366 Pa. 543, 546, 79 A.2d 232, 234 (1951) (citations
omitted).
31. 217 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1963). In Moore, a crane operator was electrocuted while
standing near a mobile crane whose boom made contact with overhead transmission lines on
government property. Id. at 292. The court held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence in the "juridical" sense because he knew of the danger of the boom being near the
wire, yet stayed in an area where he had no responsibilities. Id. at 297.
32. Id. at 297. The plaintiff's claim in Moore was, nevertheless, barred. Id.
33. Stanchis v. Hess Oil & Chem. Co., 292 F. Supp. 22 (M.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d
24 (3d Cir. 1968) (per curiam). Plaintiffs, an automobile driver and passenger, brought actions
for injuries sustained when their car collided with defendant's truck, which was blocking a
highway at the bottom of a hill without any headlights or warning signals. 292 F. Supp. at 24.
The district court held that the issue of plaintiffs' contributory negligence was a jury question
since the evidence was not sufficient to decide the issue as a matter of law. Id. at 26. As the
court explained: "Contributory negligence as a matter of law should be declared only in a very
clear case where there is no room for reasonable men to differ." Id. (citations omitted).
34. 422 Pa. 373, 378, 221 A.2d 309, 312-13 (1966).
6
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ally the rule that the plaintiff's negligence need only "contribute" to
the accident. In several decisions after Hamilton the courts, citing
Crane, specifically stated that in order to defeat recovery, the plain-
tiff's negligence need not be a proximate cause of the injury. 3 5
In 1970, however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reaffirmed
its proximate cause requirement. 36  In Argo v. Goodstein, 37 the court
held that to prevent the plaintiff's recovery, his conduct must be a
proximate cause of the occurrence of his injury, in any degree. 38 The
standard applied to the causal relationship between the plaintiff's neg-
ligence and the resulting harm was the same as that applied to the
causal relationship between defendant's negligence and the resulting
harm. 39
After Argo, the lower courts recognized that Crane had been
implicitly overruled.4 0  Until 1971, however, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania insisted that the proximate cause requirement was not
in conflict with the holding of Crane.41 Finally, in 1971, Crane was
35. See Matteo v. Sharon Hill Lanes, Inc., 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 188, 263 A.2d 910 (1970). In
Matteo, plaintiff was injured in defendant's bowling alley when a wet spot on his shoes pre-
vented him from sliding. Id. at 189, 263 A.2d at 911. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
reversed a decision below for the plaintiff, noting that the trial court's charge that the plaintiff's
negligent conduct "must be the proximate cause of the injury or hurt" was incorrect. Id. at 191
& n.1, 263 A.2d at 912 & n.1 (footnote omitted). Cf. Kapes v. Leader Dep't Store, 6 Luz. 155
(C.P. Luzerne County 1972) (court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and
stated that any negligence on the part of the plaintiff will defeat recovery; plaintiff's negligence
need not be a proximate cause of the injury).
36. Argo v. Goodstein, 438 Pa. 468, 481, 265 A.2d 783, 790 (1970).
37. 438 Pa. 468, 265 A.2d 783 (1970). Argo involved an action by a blind door-to-door
salesman for injuries sustained when he opened the door of defendant's premises, a place where
he had previously done buisness, entered, and fell in an area where there was no floor since the
premises were being remodeled. Id. at 471, 265 A.2d at 784.
38. Id. at 481, 265 A.2d at 790.
39. Id.
40. See Harrison v. Nichols, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 428, 281 A.2d 696 (1971). In Harrison, the
plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when he was struck by defendant's vehicle. Id. at 429, 281
A.2d at 698-99. The superior court affirmed the trial court's instruction that any negligence, no
matter how slight on the part of the plaintiff, would bar his action if it 'were a proximate cause
of his injury. Id. at 431-32, 281 A.2d at 698-99.
The superior court reasoned that the decision in Argo, which was rendered 20 days after
the Harrison trial, made it clear that "no matter how slight plaintiff's negligence may be it will
bar him if it is a proximate cause of his injury." hd. Argo, the court noted, appeared to overrule
Crane. Id. at 431, 281 A.2d at 698.
41. See Cebulskie v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 441 Pa. 230, 272 A.2d 171 (1971). In Cebulskie,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant railroad company's negligence in maintaining a bridge
was the proximate cause of his injuries, which were sustained when his delivery truck went off
the bridge. Id. at 231-32, 272 A.2d at 172. Defendant raised plaintiff's knowledge of the defec-
tive condition as proof of contributory negligence. Id. at 232, 272 A.2d at 172. The trial court
held for plaintiff and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that Crane did not
overturn the traditional rule in Pennsylvania that plaintiff's negligence must be a proximate
cause in order to defeat recovery. Id. at 236, 272 A.2d at 174. The court stated that the correct
rule was that plaintiff's negligence, however slight, would defeat his recovery if it were a prox-
imate cause of the accident. Id. at 233, 272 A.2d at 173. The defendant and plaintiff were thus
[VOL. 24: p. 422
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explicitly overruled in McCay v. Philadelphia Electric Co.4 2  The
court held that the "slightest degree" language in Crane had never
been the law in Pennsylvania; rather, the correct rule was that the
party who proximately caused the injuries should be held account-
able, whether plaintiff or defendant. 4 3  Both the state and federal
courts have subsequently adopted this proximate cause standard."
B. Attempts to Mitigate Harshness
of Contributory Negligence
The harshness of contributory negligence has been mitigated in
most jurisdictions by the development of doctrinal limitations. 45 Prior
to the adoption of comparative negligence, Pennsylvania incorporated
many of these limiting principles into its jurisprudence. For example,
juries have been given wide discretion in determining whether the
plaintiff's negligence is a proximate cause of the injury. 4 6  It is clear,
however, that there are limits on the jury's discretion. Where, for
example, the plaintiff has notice of a danger, yet acts in apparent
disregard of the danger without exercising due care, such disregard
may amount to contributory negligence as a matter of law if it is a
proximate cause of the accident. 47
placed in the same position: whoever was the proximate cause of the accident was legally re-
sponsible. It should be noted, however, that proximate cause is not equivalent to negligence, as
Crane might imply.
42. 447 Pa. 490, 495, 291 A.2d 759, 761-62 (1972). The plaintiff motorist was injured when
her vehicle was struck in the rear by defendant's automobile. Id. at 492, 291 A.2d at 760.
Defendant's witnesses claimed that the plaintiff stopped suddenly, and plaintiff admitted she
never looked to see if other automobiles were behind her. Id.
43. Id. at 495, 291 A.2d at 761-62. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: "The correct
statement of the law is that a plaintiff cannot recover if his own negligence, however slight,
contributes to the happening of the accident in a proximate way." Id., 291 A.2d at 762.
44. See Lockett v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 1201, 1213 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd
mei., 511 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Fardink, 231 Pa. Super. Ct. 259, 265, 331 A.2d
797, 800 (1974); Hunger v. LaBarre, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 507, 509-10, 307 A.2d 407, 408-09
(1973).
45. See notes 7-25 and accompanying text supra; notes 46-75 and accompanying text infra.
46. Poltorak v. Sandy, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 355, 345 A.2d 201 (1975). In Poltorak, two vehi-
cles collided after the plaintiff's vehicle stalled during an attempt to make a left turn. Id. at
358-59, 345 A.2d at 203. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff had failed to use due care in
crossing the highway and in taking too much time to restart the engine. Id. at 359, 345 A.2d at
203. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the issue of the existence of contributory
negligence and whether such contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the accident
were properly jury questions. Id. at 359-61, 345 A.2d at 203-04.
Another example of the wide discretion offered to the jury is Groh v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 441 Pa. 345, 271 A.2d 265 (1970). In that case, the decedent sustained fatal burns when
the downspout he was removing from a building came into contact with electrical transmission
lines. Id. at 347-48, 345 A.2d at 266. Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed a
decision for the administratrix on grounds not related to contributory negligence, the court
noted that the fact that decedent saw or should have seen the transmission lines did not make
decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Id. at 350, 345 A.2d at 268.
47. See Kronk v. West Penn Power Co., 422 Pa. 458, 463, 222 A.2d 720, 722 (1966) (plain-
8
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1. Doctrine Held Inapplicable In Cases of Intentional Torts or
Wanton Misconduct
The courts have also limited the impact of contributory negli-
gence by holding that it is inapplicable as a defense to certain con-
duct by the defendant. When a defendant intentionally inflicts an in-
jury upon a plaintiff, the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a
defense.48
In addition, although the doctrine of "last clear chance" 4' 9 has
been rejected in Pennsylvania, 50 the courts have recognized the con-
cepts of "discovered peril" 51 and "wanton misconduct,"52 both of
tiff held contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to look overhead where power
lines were plainly visible); Eberlin v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 306 Pa. 239, 241, 159 A. 439, 440
(1932) (per curiam) (plaintiff held contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to ob-
serve power lines in spite of a specific warning by his supervisor to exercise care with respect to
the wires).
48. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 18, § 22.5, at 1211. These authors stated:
"Intentional wrongdoing is so much graver a wrong than negligence both in its social conse-
quences and in the amount of resentment it arouses that the felt need both to deter and to punish
it outweighs any social benefits that are thought to accrue from the rule of contributory negli-
gence." Id. (footnote omitted). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 65, at 426.
In Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943), the court held that when an
injury is intentionally inflicted, that is, the defendant realized the probability of injury but
nevertheless continued to act, contributory negligence is not a bar to the plaintiff's cause of
action. Id. at 202-03, 34 A.2d at 525. See also Misorski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 204, 206,
34 A.2d 526, 526-27 (1943); McKnight v. Rateliff, 44 Pa. 156, 167-68 (1863); Bauchspies v.
Obert, 51 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 445 (1912).
49. The doctrine of last clear chance originated in the 1842 English case of Davies v. Mann,
10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842). In Davies, the defendant drove into the
plaintiff's animal, which was fettered in the highway. Id. at 546-47, 152 Eng. Rep. at 588. The,
court held that the plaintiff could recover, in spite of his own negligence, if the defendant might
have avoided injuring the animal by exercising proper care. Id. at 549, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589.
The first and most frequently cited explanation for the doctrine is that "if the defendant has the
last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's negligence is not a 'proximate cause' of
the result." W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 66, at 427.
50. Coleman v. Dahl, 371 Pa. 639, 644, 92 A.2d 678, 680 (1952); Kasanovich v. George, 348
Pa. 199, 202, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943).
51. See Lehman v. McCleary, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 512, 329 A.2d 862, 864 (1975); Curt
v. Ziman, 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 25, 32, 12 A.2d 802, 805 (1940); Dierolf v. Fiorito, 89 Mont. 114,
123 (C.P. Montgomery County 1967).
The Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence has characterized the doctrine as one of an-
tecedent and subsequent negligence:
Where a plaintiff, by his own carelessness, gets himself into a position of helpless peril
and there is a distinct break and lapse of time between the original negligence of plaintiff
and subsequent negligence of defendant, the plaintiff's negligence is not regarded as an
operative force constituting a contributory cause of the accident but rather merely as part
of the history of the occurrence. In this situation the sole cause of the accident is defend-
ant's subsequent negligence. Hence, there is no basis for barring plaintiff's right of re-
covery on the basis of contributory negligence under the circumstances.
SUMMARY OF PENNSYLVANIA JURISPRUDENCE, TORTS § 115, at 133 (1958). See also McFadden
v. Pennzoil Co., 341 Pa. 433, 436-39, 19 A.2d 370, 372-73 (1941); Naugle v. Reading Co., 145
Pa. Super. Ct. 341, 346, 21 A.2d 109, 111 (1941).
52. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 203, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943).
430
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which effectively produce the same result. When the plaintiff's prior
negligence leaves him in a position from which he is unable to extri-
cate himself and the defendant discovers the plaintiff's peril in time
to avoid injuring him yet fails to do so, 53 the Pennsylvania courts
have permitted the plaintiff to recover under the doctrine of "discov-
ered peril" 54 despite his antecedent negligence.
The doctrine of "wanton misconduct" has often yielded the same
result. 55 In Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad,56 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that if the jury found "wanton misconduct"
which was greater "not only in degree but in kind" from simple or
even gross negligence, then contributory negligence would not defeat
the plaintiff's recovery. 57 The court stated that if defendant's train
conductor in Geelen had possessed actual knowledge of decedent's
peril for a sufficient time to enable him to avoid the accident, a find-
ing of wanton misconduct would have been justified. 58 The Geelen
standard of actual awareness of plaintiff's peril was relaxed in Fugagli
v. Camasi.59 In that case, the court held that the defendant was not
required to have actual knowledge of the plaintiff's peril to be guilty
of wanton misconduct.60 The court indicated that to be held liable
the defendant need only have "knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a
reasonable man to realize the existing danger for a sufficient period of
time beforehand to give him a reasonable opportunity to take means
to avoid the danger, and, despite this knowledge, he recklessly ig-
nores the other person's peril."61
53.' W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 66, at 429.
54. See Dierolf v. Fiorito, 89 Mont. 114, 123 (C.P. Montgomery County 1967). Although
the court acknowledged Pennsylvania's acceptance of the doctrine of discovered peril, it refused
to apply it to a case where a four-year-old child, in the custody of her 16-year-old sister, was
injured when she darted into the street. Id. The court held that the doctrine was inapplicable
because the four-year-old was not helpless and because the plaintiff-parents did not fall within
the rule. Id.
55. See Fugagli v. Camasi, 426 Pa. 1, 3, 229 A.2d 735, 736 (1967); Geelen v. Pennsylvania
R. R., 400 Pa. 240, 248, 161 A.2d 595, 599-600 (1960); Williams v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 219
Pa. Super. Ct. 134, 137, 280 A.2d 612, 614 (1971).
56. 400 Pa. 240, 161 A.2d 595 (1960). In Geelen, a widow, whose husband was killed by a
train at a railroad crossing, brought a survival and wrongful death action. Id. at 243, 161 A.2d at
597. The railroad crossing was in disrepair, and the decedent's automobile became stuck when
it fell into a hole in the crossing and the motor stalled. Id. Decedent was subsequently struck
and killed while trying to push the car out of the hole. Id.
57. Id. at 248, 161 A.2d at 599-600.
58. Id.
59. 426 Pa. 1, 229 A.2d 735 (1967). In Canasi, plaintiff's decedent was thrown from defend-
ant's car when the car went out of control and bounced against the highway guardrails. Id. at
2-3, 229 A.2d at 735-36. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that evidence of intoxication'
and speeding could amount to wanton misconduct which would overcome plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence where the defendant's misconduct was the proximate cause of the accident. Id.
at 4, 229 A.2d at 736.
60. Id. at 3, 229 A.2d at 736 (citation omitted).
61. Id.
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2. Doctrine Inapplicable to Cases Based on Implied Warranty or
Strict Liability
Although contributory negligence is generally a defense only to
actions based upon negligence, 62 there is authority for the view that
it should be a defense in cases of breach of implied warranty. Cases
and authorities are in conflict.63 Dean Prosser has argued that the
cases fall into a consistent pattern. 64  When the conduct of the plain-
tiff consists merely of' failing to discover the hazardous nature of the
product, his cause of action in warranty is not barred .65 When he
proceeds to encounter a known risk, however, his action is barred, as
it would be under the defense of assumption of risk. 66  A parallel
analysis obtains in strict liability cases. 67  The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restate-
ment), 68 has held that contributory negligence is no defense to a
strict liability action .69 Similarly, contributory negligence is not a
defense in instances where the law imposes absolute liability upon
the defendant. 70
I'r
62. F. HARPEIR & F. JAMES, supra note 18, § 22.4, at 1210.
63. For cases holding that contributory negligence is a defense, see, e.g., Dallison v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343, 346-47 (10th Cir. 1962); McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc.,
248 A.2d 917, 920 (D.C. 1969); Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., 260 Md. 190,
200-03, 271 A.2d 744, 749-51 (1970); Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 450-52, 72 N.W.2d
861, 865-66 (1955); Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 29-31, 58 So. 2d
71, 76-77 (1952).
For cases holding that contributory negligence is not a defense, see, e.g., Texsun Feed
Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 447 F.2d 660, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Chapman,
304 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1962); Young v. Aeroil Prods. Co., 248 F.2d 185, 191 (9th Cir.
1957); Vassallo v. Sabette Land Co., 212 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18, 27 Cal. Rptr. 814, 818 (1963);
Dooms v. Stewart Boiling & Co., 68 Mich. App. 5, 18-19, 241 N.W.2d 738, 745 (1976); Richard
v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 104 R.I. 267, 273, 243 A.2d 910, 914 (1968).
See also Gardner v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 511, 127 N.W.2d 557, 562
(1964); L. FRUMEIi & M. FRIEDMAN, 2 PROmiUrs LIABILITY § 16.01[3], at 3A-26 to 3A-44
(1977).
64. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consunler), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791 (1966). Dean Prosser stated:
Where the negligence of the plaintiff consists only in failure to discover the danger in the
product, or to take precautions against its possible existence, it has uniformly been held
that it is not a bar to an action for breach of warranty .... But if he discovers the defect,
or knows the danger arising from it, and proceeds nevertheless deliberately to encounter
it by making use of the product, his conduct is the kind of contributory negligence which
overlaps assumption of risk; and on either theory his recovery is barred.
Id. at 838-39 (footnotes omitted). Accord, U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b), Comment 8; L. FRUMER & M.
FIEDIAN, supra note 63, § 16.01[3], at 3A-42 n.20.
65. Prosser, supra note 64, at 838.
66. Id. at 839.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Towrs § 402A, Comment o (1965).
68. id.
69. McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 15-16, 342 A.2d 381, 382 (1975).
The court stated: "The law should not require .. . inspection or caution when it has accepted as
reasonable the consumer's anticipation of safety." Id. at 17, 342 A.2d at 382.
70. The classic case is where the defendant harbors a wild animal which attacks and injures
11
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3. Minors
In Pennsylvania, there is a conclusive presumption that minors
under seven years of age are incapable of contributory negligence.7 1
Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that minors between
the ages of seven and fburteen are incapable of negligence. 72  Cases
have arisen regarding the fhctors that a jury may weigh to rebut this
presumption. 73  As stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the rule is that
the care and caution required of a child is measured by his capacity
to see and appreciate danger and he is held only to such measure
of discretion as is usual in those of his age and experience; this
being necessarily a varying standard, the question is ordinarily one
for the jury and not for the court. 74
The jury may be presented with evidence of the minor's education,
habits, intelligence, and experience in order to ascertain the degree
of his appreciation of danger.75
III. HISTORY OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The concept of comparative negligence in the civil law can be
traced to Roman law.7 6 Some authorities believe that Roman law
was responsible for the prevailing civil law rule that where both par-
ties have been negligent, both must share responsibility, with the
plaintiff recovering proportionately.7 7 Another legal scholar views
the source of comparative negligence to be the medieval sea
codes. 78 There is no question, however, that comparative negligence
the plaintiff. See May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101, 115 Eng. Rep. 1213 (Q.B. 1846). Another type of
absolute liability is created by safety statutes or protective statutes such as child labor acts. If a
plaintiff is injured while engaged in the activity for which the law is designed to protect him,
his action shall neither be deemed contributory negligence nor bar his recovery. H. WOODS,
supra note 4, § 1:7, at 13. See also Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71-74, 225 A.2d 905,
909-11 (1967).
71. Smith v. Waldman, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 166, 170, 164 A.2d 20, 22 (1960).
72. Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967); Seitz v. Smith, 88 York
61, 62, 66 D. & C.2d 364, 365-66 (C.P. York County 1974).
73. Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967); Seitz v. Smith, 88 York
61, 62, 66 D. & C.2d 364, 365-66 (C.P. York County 1974).
74. Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967), quoting Patterson v.
Palley Mfg. Co., 360 Pa. 259, 267, 61 A.2d 861, 865 (1948).
75. Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967). See also Seitz v. Smith,
88 York 61, 62, 66 D. & C.2d 364, 366 (C.P. York County 1974).
76. Roman law "provided that a party should assume damages in proportion to his fault and
that where damages cannot be apportioned they should be divided equally." H. WOODS, supra
note 4, § 1:9, at 17 (citation omitted). See Mole & Wilson, supra note 20, at 337.
77. Mole & Wilson, supra note 20, at 337.
78. Turk, supra note 9, at 209-18. Comparative fault has long been the rule in admiralty
cases. See Franck, Collisions (t Sea in Relation to International Maritime Law, 12 L.Q. REV.
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is firmly embedded in the civil law. 79 England adopted a compara-
tive negligence statute in 1945.80
Comparative negligence did not emerge in American jurispru-
dence until the early twentieth century. 81  At that point, comparative
negligence provisions were included in several of the federal safety
and employment statutes82 and state railway and labor acts. 83  Mis-
sissippi, in 1910, was the first state to adopt a pure comparative neg-
ligence statute applicable to all personal injuries. 84 Although Georgia
had earlier adopted a statute which provided for diminution of dam-
ages in railroad cases where the plaintiff was negligent, 85 it then
enacted a statute which provided that a "defendant is not relieved,
although the plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the injury
sustained." '8 6 Wisconsin enacted its law in 1932,87 and Arkansas
260 (1896); Huger, Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531
(1927); Mole & Wilson, supra note 20, at 339-40; Scott, Collisions at Sea, 13 L.Q. REv. 17
(1897); Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U.L. REV. 15 (1928). American courts, sitting in
admiralty, followed the early English rule for equal division of damages until 1975, when the
United States Supreme Court overruled earlier cases and provided for apportionment of dam-
ages in admiralty cases based upon degrees of fault. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421
U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
79. Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Germany, France, the Philippines, China, Japan,
Russia, Poland, and Turkey all have statutory provisions for comparative negligence. See H.
WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:9, at 17.
80. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28, § 1.
81. See Turk, supra note 9, at 333-34. Comparative negligence had emerged before then in
the field of admiralty. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
82. See Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976) (promulgated in 1908);
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (promulgated in 1920).
83. See Turk, supra note 9, at 334.
84. Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, § 1, 1910 Miss. Laws 125 (current version at Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)).
85. GA. CODE § 2979 (1860) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 94-703 (1972)), quoted in
Turk, supra note 9, at 327.
86. GA. CODE § 2914 (1860) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968)), quoted in
Turk, supra note 9, at 327 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the history of comparative
negligence in Georgia, see V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 12, § 1.5, at 18-19; Turk,
supra note 9, at 326-33. See also Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 731, 79 S.E. 836, 838
(1913). Georgia law provides that in order to recover, the plaintiff's negligence must be less
than that of the defendant. Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 120 Ga. 314, 317, 47 S.E. 923,
923 (1904).
87. Act of June 16, 1931, 1931 Wis. Laws 375 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979)). The original Wisconsin statute provided that a plaintiff could
not recover unless his negligence "was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought." Id. See Campbell, Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law, 7 Wis.
L. REV. 222, 225 (1932). It was the first of the "modified" comparative negligence rules. In
1971, Wisconsin switched to the rule that the plaintiff may recover if his negligence was equal
to or less than that of the defendant. Act of June 22, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Laws 50 (current
version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979)). Although the substance of the
current Wisconsin rule is similar to Pennsylvania's Act, Wisconsin practice generally provides
that a special verdict shall be rendered in any civil action unless the court orders otherwise.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270-27 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
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passed a statute in 1955.88 The "Wisconsin-Arkansas Plan" of modified
comparative negligence was followed by a number of states.89  In
1969, New Hampshire adopted a different variation of comparative
negligence 9" which has been widely followed in recent years. 91 At
present, twenty-eight states have enacted some form of comparative
negligence statute 9 2 and three other states have adopted it by judicial
88. Act of March 14, 1955, Act 191, 1955 Ark. Acts 443 (current version at ARK. STAT. ANN.
9 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977)). As with Wisconsin's law, Arkansas' law of comparative negli-
gence also underwent some changes. See note 87 supra. Arkansas first adopted the "pure" form
of comparative negligence, along with a mandatory special verdict. Act of March 14, 1955, Act
191, 1955 Ark. Acts 443 (repealed 1957). Soon thereafter, the "modified" form, permitting re-
covery only if the plaintiff's negligence were less than the defendant's, was substituted, and the
mandatory special verdict was eliminated. Act of March 27, 1957, Act 296, 1957 Ark. Acts 874
(repealed 1961). The present Arkansas statute omits the words "contributory negligence" en-
tirely, substituting the word "fault." ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977).
89. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:11, at 26. See notes 87 & 88 supra. The states which
adopted this form include Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wyoming. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:11, at 26.
90. Act of June 13, 1969, ch. 225, 1969 N.H. Laws 177 (current version at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977)). The New Hampshire statute permits recovery by a plaintiff whose
negligence equals or is less than that of the defendant. N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp.
1977).
91. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 1:11, at 85. There has been a decided trend towards the
New Hampshire type of comparative negligence. Id. The New Hampshire example has been
followed by Connecticut, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, and Vermont. Id. at 26-27. Hawaii, Ore-
gon, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have all recently switched to the
New Hampshire rule. Id.
92. Three distinct forms of comparative negligence statutes have been enacted. The first
type is the "pure" form, under which the plaintiff's recoverable damages are reduced by his
proportionate contributory negligence regardless of the amount of his negligence in relation to
the defendant's negligence. The following states have enacted "pure" comparative negligence
statutes: Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); New York, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (Supp. 1978);
and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.010-22.910 (Supp. 1977). Georgia has de-
veloped a unkue "pure" comparative negligence rule. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968). See
notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text supra.
The "modified" form provides that at some point, for example, when the plaintiff's negli-
gence exceeds that of the defendant's, recovery by the plaintiff is precluded. If the plaintiff's
negligence is equal to or less than the defendant's, his recovery will be reduced proportionately.
The Pennsylvania statute is of this type. The following states also have enacted "modified"
comparative negligence acts: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977); Col-
orado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1976); Connecticut, CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Supp. 1978); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b
(1976); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1978-1979); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West
Supp. 1979); Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. § 41.141 (1977); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1979); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978-1979);
Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470-510 (1977); Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a
(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); Vermont, VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); 'Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-
1979); and Wyoming, WyO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
The third form differentiates between slight and gross negligence of the parties. Damages
will be apportioned only if the plaintiff's negligence is slight and the defendant's negligence is
14
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decision. 93  It is expected that most jurisdictions enacting compara-
tive negligence statutes in the future will adopt either the New
Hampshire plan or the pure form.94
IV. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
The notion of' comparative negligence was first introduced in the
Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1943.95 Several proposals were
submitted befbre the legislature adopted the Comparative Negligence
Act in 1976.96
Unfortunately, because of the paucity of legislative history, it is
unknown why the legislature adopted the particular form of compara-
tive negligence it did. 97  Nowhere did the legislators indicate that
gross. Only Nebraska, Act of Apr. 5, 1978, Legis. Bill No. 665, § 6, 1978 Neb. Laws 565 (to be
codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151), and South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 20-9-2 (1967), have this type of statute. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 367-69 (1974); H.
WOODS, supra note 4, at 421 app.
93. The following states adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision: Alaska, in
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Califirnia, in Li v. Yellow Cal) Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); and Florida, in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973).
Eds. Note: Michigan has judicially adopted comparative negligence since the printing of
this symposium. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, - Mich. 375 N.W.2d 511,
514 (1979).
94. H. WooDs, supra note 4, § 4:4, at 85. See notes 90 & 92 supra. It should be noted that
all three of the comparative negligence systems which have been court adopted, rather than
statutory, have been of the "pore" form. See cases cited note 93 supra.
95. H.B. 604, 135th Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1943, 27 PA. LEG. J. 725 (1943). On March 9,
1943, House Bill No. 604 was introduced in an attempt to implement the doctrine. At that
time, one commentator stated:
House Bill No. 604, sounding in comparative negligence, should be written into the
law of Pennsylvania without a struggle. This, however, will not come to pass. The law of
contributory negligence favors corporate defendants, insurance companies, and public
utilities. They arc not subject to the denial of justice which a strict application of the rule
produces, as they do not come into court in the capacity of a plaintiff. An occasional
compromise verdict is preferable to them over a system which would impose liability
commensurate with their negligence. Their opposition to the bill will be strenuous.
Note, Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania?, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 276, 286 (1943).
96. Pa. S.B. 1237, 159th Cen. Assembly, Sess. 1975, was introduced by Senators Hager,
Murphy, Scanlon, Kelley, Amlaerman, I)ufield, and Lewis. I PA. LEG. J. 1080-81 (Senate
1975). Final passage in the Senate occurred on June 15, 1976, by a vote of 48 to 1. 1 PA. LEG.
J. 1707-08 (Senate 1976). Final passage in the House occurred on June 30, 1976, by a vote of
173 to 19. 1 PA. LEC. J. 5932-33 (House 1976).
A bill with the same wording as that contained in the present statute had been introduced
in the Senate in 1975 by the sponsors of S.B. 1237, but was not adopted. See I PA. LEG. J. 648
(Senate 1975). A coumparative negligence provision had also been included in a proposed
amendment to the No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-
.701 (Purdon Supp. 1978-1979). 1 PA. LEG. J. 4753-56 (House 1974).
97. The only published legislative history on comparative negligence in Pennsylvania is a
discussion in the Senate concerning an amendment, Proposed Amendment to S.B. 1237, 160th
Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1976, 1 PA. LEG. J. 1703 (Senate 1976), which was eventually defeated, fore-
closing recovery where the plaintiff's negligence was equal to that of the defendant's and requir-
ing special findings of fict. See 1 PA. LEG. J. 1703-08 (Senate 1976). Aside from the fact that all
the senators seemed in agreement that the prime motivation for the Act was to eliminate the
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they were basing the Pennsylvania Act on another state's law. 98  In1
fact, no state has a comparative negligence statute identical to that of
Pennsylvania. For this reason, decisions by the courts of other juris-
dictions are of limited usefulness in construing problems which arise
under the Pennsylvania Act.
The Pennsylvania Act is a codification of the "modified" form of
comparative negligence. 99 It does not abolish the defense of con-
tributory negligence, but simply operates to reduce the plaintiff's
damages proportionately where his negligence was not greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants. Where the
plaintiff's negligence was greater than the causal negligence of the
defendant, the plaintiff's claim is barred.
"Modified" comparative negligence statutes, such as Pennsyl-
vania's, have been widely criticized as producing only "modified" jus-
tice. 100 Critics claim that "nonpure" statutes can be justified on no
basis other than pure political compromise.' 0 ' The fears of insurance
companies that costs would skyrocket as a result of increases in the
size and number of plaintiffs' claims following the enactment of com-
parative negligence statutes are well-known. Despite the fact that
complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery for even slight negligence, the brief discussion provides
little insight. See id.
98. One commentator has disagreed, citing an isolated comment by Senator Hager as sup-
port for the view that the Pennsylvania Act was intended to follow that of Wisconsin. See
Timby, Comparative Negligence, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 219, 221 (1977); Timby & Plevyak, The Effect
of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute on Traditional Tort Concepts and Doctrines,
Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania 24 VILL. L. REV. 453, 462 (1979). The
only sense in which the Pennsylvania Act is based upon Wisconsin's statute is that Wisconsin
had previously adopted the same type of modified comparative negligence. See note 87 supra.
The actual language of the statutes is appreciably different. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045
(West Supp. 1978-1979).
99. For definitions of the different types of comparative negligence, see note 92 supra.
100. The nonpure approach has been described as a "giant step in the wrong direction" and
as a "misfit in a svstem designed to distribute responsibility according to degrees of fault"
because in too many cases it betrays the just principle of apportionment of damages. Schwartz,
Pure Comparative Negligence in Action, 34 J. AM. TRIAL LAw. A. 117, 119 (1972), quoting
Campbell, Recent Developments of the Law of Negligence in Wisconsin-Part II, 1956 Wis. L.
REV. 4, 21. See also C. MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 215 n.1 (1953) (terming the Wisconsin
statute a "curious failure to take full advantage of the comparative fault principle"). Another
commentator has stated:
The depressing result of. . .[the nonpure approach] is that it incites migraine in the
judicial process; emasculates apportionment where the fault of the parties is anywhere
near approximately equal; generates excessive, prolix, and costly appeals, in which the
court is asked to unscramble, scrutinize, and second guess a jury's finding of comparative
fault; and in effect to frustrate and defeat the vital core of the apportionment system in a
sizeable group of cases falling in the borderland of approximately equal fault.
Lambert, supra note 22, at 764-65 (citation omitted).
101. See W. PROSSER, Comparative Negligence, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LA\V OF
ToRrs 46 (1954). Dean Prosser stated: "It appears impossible to justify the [50%] rule on any
basis except one of pure political compromise." Ild.
1978-1979]
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statistical studies refute these allegations of the insurers, 10 2 the mod-
ified form of comparative negligence is still the most prevalent form
and remains the rule in Pennsylvania.
V. SPECIFIC ISSUES UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ACT
As a result of its brevity, the Pennsylvania Act fails to answer
many of the questions which arise regarding its application. For
example, one must ask whether the statute applies only to actions
based on negligent conduct by the defendant, or whether the plain-
tiff's negligence will be compared, and damages apportioned, where
the defendant has acted intentionally or wantonly. One must further
inquire whether the plaintiff's negligence will be compared with the
defendant's where the action is based on breach of warranty or strict
liability. The impact of comparative negligence upon the doctrines of
discovered peril and assumption of risk must also be examined. One
must additionally consider the practical effects of the Act upon trial
practice. In some instances, the statute itself or the developing case
law in Pennsylvania provides an answer. In other instances, analysis
must depend upon case law from other jurisdictions and policy con-
siderations. It is important to remember in all cases that the Com-
parative Negligence Act does not alter the prior substantive law of
negligence, but merely changes the effect of plaintiff's contributory
negligence upon his right to recover and the amount of recovery.
A. When Will the Plaintiff's Negligence
Be Compared and Damages Apportioned?
Theories of Liability other than Negligence
Adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act gives rise to ques-
tions of whether the statute should apply to causes of action based on
theories of liability other than negligence.103 The statute refers only
to "all actions brought to recover damages for negligence." Although
some comparative negligence statutes in other states similarly refer
only to causes of action for negligence, courts in some of these states
102. For discussions of both the claims and rebuttals concerning the impact of comparative
negligence statutes, see Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58
MICH. L. REv. 689 (1960); Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v. Contributory Negligence, 1968
INS. L.J. 725; Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey,
13 ARK. L. REv. 89 (1959); Note, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experi-
ence, 22 ARK. L. REv. 692 (1969).
103. See V. SCHVARTZ, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 34-35.
[VOL. 24: p. 422
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have nevertheless applied their comparative negligence statutes to ac-
tions based on other theories of liability.104 Professor Victor
Schwartz has advocated the application of comparative negligence,
even when the statute specifically states that it is limited to actions
based on negligence, whenever "reason and policy dictate that the
principle of reducing plaintiff's recovery on the basis of his fault
would be helpful."105 In Pennsylvania, however, section 1921(b) of
the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 106 requires that "[wihen the
words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of
it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit." 107 It is therefore questionable whether section 1 of the
Comparative Negligence Act, referring to "actions ... for negli-
gence," will be held to apply to other theories of liability in Pennsyl-
vania.
1. Intentional Torts
Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute should be con-
strued to be inapplicable to an action against a defendant for an inten-
tional tort. At common law, contributory negligence was not a de-
fense to an action for an intentional tort, 10 8 and this is also the rule in
Pennsylvania. 0 9
It could be argued that the adoption of a comparative negligence
statute evidences a public policy of reducing damages in proportion to
plaintiff's misconduct that should be applied to intentional torts. The
two states which have decided this issue, Wisconsin and New Jersey,
have held, however, that their comparative negligence statutes do not
apply to actions for intentional misconduct.110 Both states, like
Pennsylvania, have statutes which limit the applicability of compara-
tive negligence to actions for "negligence." '  Since the difference
between intentional misconduct and negligence is considered "not
merely in degree but in the kind of fault," 112 a strict construction of
104. See text accompanying notes 114-17 infra.
105. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, § 12.1, at 195.
106. PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b) (1975).
107. ld.
108. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
109. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 202-03, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943).
110. Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 514, 351 A.2d 409, 415 (Law Div. 1976)
(dictum); Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 545-46, 103 N.W.2d 560, 564 (1960). Henry
Woods has also stated that there should be little controversy that comparative negligence will
have no effect upon the rule that contributory negligence is no defense to a defendant's inten-
tional conduct. H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 7:1, at 159.
111. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
Supp. 1978-1979).
112. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 65, at 426.
1978-1979]
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Pennsylvania's statute should render it inapplicable to actions for in-
tentional conduct.
2. Wanton Misconduct
Under prior law in Pennsylvania, contributory negligence was
not a defense to an action for an injury caused by wanton miscon-
duct. a a3 It should also not be a defense under the Comparative Neg-
ligence Act. The Pennsylvania courts have not yet specifically ad-
dressed this issue, however, and the decisions in other states are divided.
Wisconsin 114 and Arkansas 115 courts have held that a plaintiff's
negligence is subject to comparison with the defendant's willful and
wanton misconduct. In Bielski v. Schulze, 116 the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin stated that any negligence of a tortfeasor causing injury should
be evaluated on a relative fhult basis. 117
The Superior Court of New Jersey reached a contrary conclusion
in Draney v. Bachman,118 wherein it held that the negligence of the
plaintiff is no defense where defendant's conduct is "willful, wanton,
and reckless." 119 In its decision, the court relied on recent New Jer-
sey cases which had recognized a claim of willful, wanton, and reck-
less conduct as a separate offense, 120 and held that the comparative
negligence statute should not apply to such conduct.121
There appears to be no valid reason to abandon the prior law of
Pennsylvania following the enactment of the Comparative Negligence
Act, especially in light of the express language of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, which stated that "wanton misconduct is something
different from negligence however gross,-different not merely in
degree but in kind, and evincing a different state of mind on the part
of the tortfeasor."122 The Comparative Negligence Act, which pro-
vides for the comparison of negligence of the parties, should thus be
113. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 203-04, 34 A.2d 523, 525-26 (1943).
114. Bielski v. Sehulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962).
115. Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Arkansas law).
Arkansas has codified this rule in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (Supp. 1977).
116. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
117. Id. at 17-18, 114 N.W.2d at 113.
118. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (Law Div. 1976).
119. Id. at 514, 351 A.2d at 415.
120. 1d. at 513, 351 A.2d at 414-15, citing McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc.. 56 N.J. 288, 266
A.2d 284 (1970); Acken v. Campbell, 134 N.J. Super. 481, 342 A.2d 209 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd
per curiam, 67 N.J. 585, 342 A.2d 172 (1975).
121. 138 N.J. Super. at 514, 351 A.2d at 415, construing N.J. STAT. ANN. J§ 2A:15-5.1 to -3
(West Supp. 1979).
122. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 203, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943).
[VOL. 24: p. 422
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inapplicable to cases where the defendant has engaged in wanton
misconduct.
If, however, Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute were
deemed to be applicable to an action for willful, wanton, or reckless
conduct by a defendant, it should be construed to apply only to com-
pensatory damages and not to any punitive damages that might be
recoverable. 123  The statute refers to diminishing "any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff," that is, compensatory damages, in proportion
to his contributory negligence. It does not require diminishing all
damages otherwise recoverable by him, that is, punitive damages.
"[D]aiages sustained by the plaintiff" should therefore be inter-
preted to embrace only compensatory damages intended to compen-
sate the plaintiff for harm sustained by him, and not punitive damn-
ages which are designed to punish the defendant and to deter future
reckless conduct. ' 2 4
3. Products Liability
In Webb v. Zern,125 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted
strict liability as embodied in section 402A of the Restatement. 126
Comment n to this section 127 abolishes contributory negligence as a
defense in cases based on strict liability. 128  In Berkebile v. Brantly
Helicopter Cor).,'129 the court held that "the 'reasonable man' stan-
dard in any form has no place in a strict liability case," 130 concluding
that "[a] plaintiff cannot be precluded from recovery in a strict liabil-
ity case because of his own negligence." 131 The enactment of a com-
parative negligence statute thus has no effect upon the prior Pennsyl-
vania law of products liability, and contributory negligence remains
unavailable as a defense to strict liability and warranty cases.
123. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida so held in Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1973). The court
held that while plaintiff's negligence would be used to diminish compensatory damages, no
diminution should be made in punitive damages. Id.
124. See Sherman, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38 U.
PITT. L. REV. 51, 71 (1976).
125. 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
126. Id. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854, adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
128. Comment n provides: "[T]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntar-
ily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the
name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability.
Id.
129. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
130. Id. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900.
131. 1d. at 100, 337 A.2d at 901.
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4. Ultrahazardous Activities
The Pennsylvania comparative negligence statute should be
deemed inapplicable to cases involving strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities. Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
is a fundamental basis for liability distinguishable from liability based
on negligence. 132
Although Pennsylvania courts have not specifically ruled whether
contributory negligence is a defense to an action based on a theory of
absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities, a footnote in McCown
v. International Harvester Co. 133 indicated that the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania would adopt the Restatement exclusion of contribu-
tory negligence as a defense to an action involving ultrahazardous ac-
tivity. 134
Section 524 of the Restatement 135 provides that "[e]xcept as
stated in Subsection (2), the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is
not a defense to the strict liability of one who carries on an abnor-
mally dangerous activity." 136 Subsection (2) speaks of a plaintiff
"knowingly and unreasonably subjecting himself to the risk of harm,"
commonly known as a form of assumption of risk. '3 7 The same
reasoning should apply to this situation as well as to strict liability
generally. The Comparative Negligence Act should thus have no ef-
fect upon the nonavailability of the contributory negligence defense in
ultrahazardous activity cases.
B. Impact of Comparative Negligence
Upon Other Defenses
Following the advent of comparative negligence, the Pennsyl-
vania courts must determine the continued viability of the plaintiff-
protecting defenses developed under precomparative negligence law
and of the defendant-protecting doctrine of assumption of risk.
1. Residual Voluntary Assumption of Risk Defense
Since the Act provides that the negligence of the parties is to be
compared, and the plaintiff's recovery reduced proportionately, the
132. Sherman, supra note 124, at 71.
133. 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975).
134. Id. at 17 n.5, 342 A.2d at 382 n.5. See notes 127 & 128 and accompanying text supra.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1977).
136. Id.
137. Id.
[VOL. 24: p. 422
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question arises whether assumption of risk should remain a complete
defense.
It has been the law of Pennsylvania that a person who assumes
the risk of danger may not recover for personal injuries sustained as a
result of that danger.' 38 The Pennsylvania courts, however, have en-
countered difficulty in distinguishing between assumption of risk and
contributory negligence.' 39 Following the enactment of comparative
negligence in Pennsylvania, this lack of clarity poses a substantial
problem if contributory negligence is to be compared, while assump-
tion of risk is to operate as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery. As
long as the distinction continues to be drawn, and disparate results
reached, characterization of the plaintiff's conduct will be highly im-
portant.
One source of the difficulty encountered by the Pennsylvania
courts in applying the doctrine of assumption of risk may lie upon the
fact that two types of assumption of risk are recognized in Pennsyl-
vania. 140  In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,1 4 1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that, in
Pennsylvania, assumption of risk is divided into assumption of risk in
the "primary sense" and assumption of risk in the "secondary
sense."' 142 Assumption of risk in its "primary and strict sense in-
volves voluntary exposure to an obvious or known danger which ne-
gates liability." 143 In the primary sense, assumption of risk bars the
plaintiff's claim since he is assumed, through his actions, to have re-
lieved the defendant of any duty to protect him. 44 Assumption of
risk in its secondary sense "involves a failure to exercise reasonable
care for one's own safety," and is "ordinarily synonymous with con-
tributory negligence." 145 It is an affirmative defense that can be as-
138. Hall v. Ziegler, 361 Pa. 228, 230-31, 64 A.2d 767, 768-69 (1949); Cutler v. Peck Lumber
Mfg. Co., 350 Pa. 8, 12, 37 A.2d 739, 741 (1944).
139. See Miller v. Dunbar Borough, 403 Pa. 545, 546, 170 A.2d 593, 594 (1961) (per curiam);
Kopp v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 385 Pa. 460, 462-63, 123 A.2d 429, 431 (1956); Bockstoce v.
Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 159 Pa. Super. Ct. 237, 241-42, 48 A.2d 126, 128-29 (1946). See also Joyce
v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 580, 585-88, 205 A.2d 611, 614-15 (1964) (discussing the confusion
resulting from attempts to distinguish the concepts).
140. See Elliott v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 160 Pa. Super. Ct. 291, 294-95, 50 A.2d 537,
539 (1947).
141. 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966). In Pritchard, a cigarette
smoker, alleging that he had developed lung cancer as a result of his habit, sued the manufac-
turer of Chesterfield cigarettes on the basis of negligence and breach of warranty. 350 F.2d at
481.
142. 350 F.2d at 484.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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serted only if it is established that the defendant has breached a
duty. 146
The primary assumption of risk presents no problems under the
comparative negligence statute. Courts in other comparative negli-
gence jurisdictions have made it clear that the defense remains in-
tact, 147 and it may be expected that Pennsylvania's courts will also so
hold.
The treatment of implied assumption of risk under the compara-
tive negligence statute, however, has not yet been squarely decided
by the Pennsylvania courts. It appears that the trend in Pennsylvania
is towards the merger of secondary assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence. In Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 148 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ob-
served: "Pennsylvania takes the progressive attitude that because of
the overlap in concepts, assumption of the risk in its secondary sense
should be merged into the definition of contributory negligence
avoiding the use of the term assumption of the risk altogether." 149
Since, as the Third Circuit stated in Pritchard, secondary assumption
of risk in Pennsylvania is "synonymous with contributory negli-
gence," 150 there is no logical reason not to merge the two concepts.
Cases and authority in other jurisdictions are in favor of this ap-
146. See id. Other jurisdictions have drawn the same distinction, although some courts have
used the terms "express" and "implied" assumption of risk instead of primary and secondary.
See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290-93 (Fla. 1977); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d
398, 402-03 (Me. 1976); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 95-96, 515 P.2d 821,
826 (1973); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 120 N.W.2d 63, 67 (1963). For general
discussions of these concepts, see W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 68, at 439-47; V. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 4, § 9.1, at 153-58.
Some jurisdictions have further divided implied assumption of risk into "reasonable" and
"unreasonable" conduct. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d at 290. See also W. PROSSER, supra
note 20, § 68, at 440-41. Pennsylvania law, however, does not define assumption of risk to
include reasonable conduct. For example, assumption of risk as applied to § 402A products
liability means that "one who voluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to encounter a known
danger [bears] the risk of that danger." Henrich v. Cutler Hammer Co., 460 F.2d 1325, 1326
(3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). See Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771, 772-73 (3d
Cir. 1971).
"Reasonable" implied' assumption of risk has never been favored. See James, Assumption of
Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 192 (1968). A number of states abolished this
form of assumption of risk before adopting comparative negligence. See, e.g., Hale v. O'Neill,
492 P.2d 101, 103 (Alas. 1971); Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 591-93 (Ky. 1967); Meistrich
v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 54-57, 155 A.2d 90, 96-97 (1959).
147. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 1977); Wilson v. Gordon, 354
A.2d 398, 403 (Me. 1976); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 95, 515 P.2d 821,
826 (1973).
148. 376 F. Supp. 1324 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
149. Id. at 1327 (citations omitted).
150. 350 F.2d at 484.
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proach, 151 and it is also the more equitable result in light of Pennsyl-
vania's express legislative purpose of appoftionment according to
fault. Plaintiffs who engage in "synonymous" conduct should not be
treated differently by the courts. Whether characterized as assump-
tion of risk or as contributory negligence, any culpable conduct of the
plaintiff should be compared with that of the defendant, and his dam-
ages reduced proportionately.
2. Discovered Peril
One must determine the effect of the comparative negligence
statute upon the doctrine of last clear chance or, as styled in Pennsyl-
vania, "discovered peril." It may initially be argued that comparative
negligence should have no effect upon the existing substantive law of
contributory negligence, and that comparative negligence simply re-
duces damage recovery by a plaintiff where his negligence otherwise
exists. Further, it can be urged that at least one of the purposes for
adoption of the discovered peril notion was a recognition that not-
151. Three states resolved the issue immediately by abolishing any distinction between the
doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence in the comparative negligence stat-
utes themselves. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAV § 1411 (McKinney 1976); O. REV. SrAT. § 18.475 (1977). Seven states have accomplished
the same result by judicial decision. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 1977) (there
is no distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk); Wilson v. Gordon,
354 A.2d 398, 402-03 (Me. 1976) (defense of assumption of risk abolished); Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971) (voluntary, unreasonable assumption
of risk retained as an element of contributory negligence to be apportioned under comparative
negligence statute); Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (N.D. 1974) (abolition based on
amendment to comparative negligence statute); Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751,
758 (Tex. 1975) (assumption of risk abolished in negligence cases); Lyons v. Redding Constr.
Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 95, 515 P.2d 821, 826 (1973) (assumption of risk is not available where
contributory negligence is a defense); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 258, 120 N.W.2d
63, 67 (1963) (implied assumption of risk should be couched in terms of contributory negli-
gence). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin had earlier abolished the doctrine as it applied to
certain cases. See McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 378, 113
N. W.2d 14, 16 (1962) (assumption of risk no longer a separate defense between automobile host
and guest); Colson v. Rule, 15 Wis. 2d 387, 395, 113 N.W.2d 21, 25 (1962) (assumption of risk
defense abrogated in farn labor cases). Only five states appear to retain the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk as a complete defense. Spradlin v. Klunp, 244 Ark. 841, 841, 427 S.W.2d 542, 543
(1968); McChargue v. Black Grading Contractors, Inc., 122 Ga. App. 1, 4, 176 S.E.2d 212, 216
(1970); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 823, 29 So. 2d 646, 649 (1947); Mason v. Western Power
& Gas Co., 183 Neb. 392, 395, 160 N.W.2d 204, 206 (1968); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406,
411, 92 N.W.2d 654, 657 (1958). Only in Georgia is the doctrine vigorously applied with cases
suggesting that even reasonable implied assumption of risk may bar a plaintiff's claim. See
Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga. App. 275, 275-76, 176 S.E.2d 714, 714-15 (1970) (summary judgment
iaotion by defendants should have been granted); Wade v. Roberts, 118 Ga. App. 284, 287, 163
S.E.2d 343, 345-46 (1968) (same). Arkansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, and South Dakota have
given only reluctant cognizance to the doctrine of implied assumption of risk by applying it only
when the plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, and by giving juries wide latitude to hear and
reject the defense. See Spradlin v. Klump, 244 Ark. at 841, 427 S.W.2d at 543; Saxton v. Rose,
201 Miss. at 823, 29 So. 2d at 649; Mason v. Western Power & Gas Co., 183 Neb. at 395, 160
N.W.2d at 206: Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. at 411, 92 N.W.2d at 657.
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withstanding the negligence of a plaintiff which placed him in a pre-
dicament, antecedent fault should not be treated as the proximate
cause of an accident when the defendant knew or had reason to know
of the predicament and his timely action could have avoided the oc-
currence.152  It would therefore seem anomalous to abolish the dis-
covered peril doctrine as a corollary to the enactment of comparative
negligence. The net effect of this would be to constrict prior substan-
tive law and impose a reduction of damages upon a plaintiff who
would have been in a better position had there not been a compara-
tive fault statute in the first place. This view has further weight in
cases which are not analyzed on the basis of discovered peril, but
rather are decided under the doctrine of wanton misconduct or
recklessness.153 Many fact situations involving a plaintiff who negli-
gently finds himself in a hopeless predicament and is thereafter in-
jured due to the failure of the defendant to act within a specified time
frame have been decided according to either approach.154 Clearly, it
is more difficult to suggest that wanton misconduct is no longer a
defense under a comparative negligence statute of the Pennsylvania
type than to argue that the discovered peril defense should be abro-
gated. 155
It has nonetheless beeni impressively argued by scholars, com-
mentators,156 and courts 157 that a comparative fault statute demands
an abrogation of the last clear chance or discovered peril doctrines. In
support of this view it is pointed out that the principal rationale for
the discovered peril notion was to ameliorate the harshness of the
traditional contributory negligence rule, and that since a comparative
negligence statute largely obviates the problem. it is no longer neces-
sary or even fair to retain the doctrine. 158 It is further urged that
152. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 66, at 427.
153. See notes 48-61 and accompanying text supra.
154. See, e.g., Geelen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 400 Pa. 240, 248, 161 A.2d 595, 600 (1960);
Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 204, 34 A.2d 523, 526 (1943).
155. See notes 113-24 and accompanying text supra.
156. For authorities labelling last clear chance a transitional doctrine whose usefulness has
ended, see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 18, § 22.12, at 1241-45; W. PROSSER, supra
note 20, § 66, at 427-29; H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 8:2, at 172-74; James, Last Clear Chance:
A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 722-23 (1938); McIntyre, The Rationale of Last
Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 1251-52 (1940).
157. For cases abrogating the doctrine of last clear chance following adoption of comparative
negligence, see Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
3(d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 850 (Me. 1968). Wisconsin effectively
abolished the last clear chance doctrine prior to adoption of comparative negligence by declaring
that contributory negligence by the plaintiff would defeat recovery absent gross negligence by
the defendant. Switzer v. Detroit Inv. Co., 188 Wis. 330, 334, 206 N.W. 407, 408 (1925).
158. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047-48 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.
.3d 804, 824, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 872 (1975); F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
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the discovered peril doctrine did involve conduct by a plaintiff which,
by causation principles, was "proximately" related to the occur-
rence. 15 9 A survey of the case law suggests that abrogation of the last
clear chance doctrine is the prevailing view. 160  The issue, however,
is not free from doubt. Although certain comparative fault statutes
have simply resolved the matter by black letter abolition of the last
clear chance doctrine, 161 the Pennsylvania law leaves this issue open.
3. Minors
Traditionally, tort law has not held children to the same standard
of care as that for adults. 162 A child under seven years of age is
conclusively presumed incapable of negligence, 163 and a child be-
tween the ages of seven and fourteen is protected by a rebuttable
presumption.164 Under Pennsylvania law, the measure of a child's
capacity for contributory negligence is his ability to see, understand,
and avoid danger, determined by the expected behavior of children of'
like age, intelligence, and experience.165 It is thus necessary to
examine the impact, if any, which the Comparative Negligence Act
has upon the treatment of minors.
The Act clearly has no effect upon the standard of care for de-
termining a child's negligence. Wisconsin, however, has developed an
interesting technique for apportioning damages in cases of' con-
tributorily negligent minors under their comparative negligence
law. 166 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that the youthful-
ness of a plaintiff must be considered twice in a negligence action.1 67
supra note 18, § 22.12, at 1262-63; H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 8:2, at 172-74.
159. See Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846, 849 (Me. 1968). The Supreme Court of Maine
stated: "The theory that because the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the harm his
negligence must have been the sole proximate cause is hardly consistent with the modern con-
cept that several acts of negligence may combine to cause proximately an accident." Id.
160. See H. WOODS, supra note 4, § 8:2, at 172-73.
161. See CONN. GEN. SWAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West Supp. 1978); Os. REV. STAT. §
18.475(1) (1977).
162. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
163. See Smith v. Waldman, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 166, 170, 164 A.2d 20, 22 (1960).
164. See Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967); Seitz v. Smith, 88
York 61, 62, 66 D. & C.2d 364, 365-66 (C.P. York County 1974).
165. Masters v. Alexander, 424 Pa. 65, 71, 225 A.2d 905, 909 (1967); Koenig v. Flaherty, 383
Pa. 187, 189-91, 117 A.2d 719, 720-21 (1955). See also Seitz v. Smith, 88 York 61, 62, 62 1). &
C.2d 364, 366 (C.P. York County 1974).
166. See Gremban v. Burke, 33 Wis. 2d 1, 146 N.W.2d 453 (1966); Blahnik v. Dax, 22 Wis.
2d 67, 125 N.W.2d 364 (1963); Brice v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 520, 76 N.\V.2d
337 (1956).
167. Gremban v. Burke, 33 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 146 N.W.2d 453, 456 (1966); Blahnik v. Dax, 22
Wis. 2d 67, 76, 125 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1963); Brice v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 520,
524, 76 N.W.2d 337, 340 (1956).
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Not only should the plaintiff's age be considered in determining the
child's contributory negligence, but age should also be a factor
weighed by the jury in apportioning damages. 168 Although Wiscon-
sin's position is unique, it may in the future be considered by
Pennsylvania courts at the request of counsel for minor plaintiffs for
whom the Wisconsin approval could operate advantageously.
In cases involving children under age seven who have enjoyed a
conclusive presumption of due care for obvious policy reasons, it may
be persuasively argued that comparative negligence has no effect.
C: Comparative Negligence
at Trial
As previously stated, the Comparative Negligence Act does not
significantly alter Pennsylvania substantive or procedural law. It
merely controls the impact of a plaintiff's contributory negligence
upon his potential recovery. Certain questions which have been
raised regarding the Act are thus really not issues. The Comparative
Negligence Act does not affect the prior existing law on causation or
burden of proof. It also does not affect the availability of procedures
such as summary judgments and directed verdicts. As under prior
law, the issue of contributory negligence will rarely be taken friom the
jury. 169
The Act does raise significant issues regarding multiple defend-
ants, jury instructions, and verdicts. These problems and their po-
tential solutions under the Act are discussed in another article in this
symposium. 170
D. Anticipated Effects Upon Practice
Naturally; it is premature to assess the actual effects the
Penn 1 sylvania comparative negligence law will have upon personal in -
jury practice. Developing case law and future statutory amendments
will better decipher for the practitioner the legal parameters of the
law in practice. Experience with the normal handling of claims be.-
tween and among plaintiff's counsel, defendant's counsel, and claims
adjusters will inevitably generate rules of thumb in terms of the prac-
tical effects of the law.
168. Gremban v. Burke, 33 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 146 N.W.2d 453, 456 (1966); Blahnik v. Dax, 22
Wis. 2d 67, 76, 125 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1963); Brice v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 520,
524, 76 N.W.2d 337, 340 (1956).
169. See Prosser, supra note 20, at 481.
170. See Beasley & Tunstall, supra note 6.
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For the present, while empirical data remains scarce, it may
fairly be predicted that, overall, comparative negligence will not
greatly exacerbate claims loss experience. This has at least been the
lesson of those jurisdictions whose comparative negligence rule is
analogous to the Pennsylvania rule. 171
The worst fears of the proponents and opponents of a compara-
tive negligence rule will almost certainly not be realized. Compara-
tive negligence will, however, clearly change the result in individual
categories of cases, largely in terms of damage reduction in what pre-
viously were thought to be "clear" liability cases and of the rescuing
of many "no liability" claims. The latter category will include "slip
and fall" cases in which the strict contributory negligence rule was
long the bane of injured pedestrians and shoppers. Also included will
be the two car accident cases, particularly at intersections where the
burden of the inquiry has been "who struck John" and/or "who had
the red light." Still other categories of cases fitting into this mold will
be construction site accidents involving failure to observe or to react
in time to the risk, pedestrian crossing accidents involving failure to
observe approaching vehicular traffic, various types of recreational ac-
tivity accidents where the plaintiff creates or enhances the risk of
injury by his own activity that is sometimes styled as voluntary as-
sumption of the risk, and a select category of medical malpractice
claims involving failure to report symptoms in time or to follow medi-
cal advice. These are all instances of cases which, in the past, often
have been fatally flawed by the strict contributory negligence rule. As
a practical matter, it may be anticipated that these claims will at least
have settlement value beyond the mere cost of defending the claim in
court.
On the other hand, the settlement or verdict value of strong lia-
bility claims may be compromised. In significant damage cases, this
may prove to be a substantial financial benefit to defendants and their
171. See Rosenberg, supra note 102; Note, supra note 102 (follow-up study). Examining the im-
pact of comparative negligence upon judicial administration, Professor Rosenberg concluded that
although "[i]ntroduction of comparative negligence brought perceptible changes to the course of
personal injury litigation, . . . it did not drastically alter the size or quality of the courts' bur-
dens in processing these cases." Rosenberg, supra note 102, at 108. See Note, supra note 102,
at 713. He stated further that while plaintiffs did win a higher percentage of verdicts, they did
not obtain greater recoveries. Rosenberg, supra note 102, at 108.
. A study of Wisconsin's comparative negligence system of 40 years duration concluded that
it had not resulted in higher insurance rates than those in comparable areas. Pfankuch, supra
note 102, at 731. In a meticulous and detailed study, another author concluded that there was
no definite or precise effect of comparative fault upon automobile liability insurance. Peck,
supra note 102, at 726. The study further found that there was not any "effect upon the claims
consciousness of the general public." Id. at 726-27.
1978-1979]
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insurers, for it is the rare case where it is not possible to articulate
some element of' contributory fault. Under comparative negligence,
astute defense counsel may elect to concede his client's negligence,
making his trial strategy pivot around proving to the jury's satisfaction
that plaintiff was also negligent and that the verdict should therefore
be reduced in proportion to plaintiff's negligence. For example, the
intersectional motor vehicle collision often includes an ingredient of
contributory fault, particularly in the legal context of the obligation of
any motorist to be on the lookout for approaching traffic. It requires
no lengthy recitation of examples to understand that the law of torts
deals primarily with the human frailty of live actors whose conduct
rarely measures up perfectly against the reasonable man standard.
The challenge to litigation cotIIel in dealing with comparative
negligence is plain. The all-or-nothing strategy, which typically has
characterized the offense and defense in personal injury cases, must
be rethought. Plaintiff's counsel must consider the prospects for a
finding of contributory fault, the approximate measure thereof, and
whether the case will have greater credibility if contributory negli-
gence is dealt with "out front" and an effort is made to limit the
finding. In other cases, counsel may determine that it is better
strategically to insist upon one hundred percent fault on the part of
defendants and leave it to their counsel to prove contributory negli-
gence and the amount thereof. A converse judgment must obviously
be made by defense counsel. The problem is more complex in the
case of defense counsel's individual judgment in multi-party cases. If
there is a significant prospect of joint liability on the part of more
than one defendant, that party's counsel might attempt at the outset
to suggest comparative fault to the jury and the degree thereof.
One common challenge to the bar and its ingenuity is the man-
ner in which the jury should be urged to quantify contributory fault.
The measuring rods must be defined. Counsel must decide whether
it is better fiom the plaintiff's point of view either to argue a small
percentage of contributory fault, or none at all, or to double the em-
phasis on the amount of the damage with the thought that even a
significant degree of contributory fault will still net a decent damage
award fbir the plaintiff. Again, the reciprocal situation obtains for the
defendant. No reason is apparent why both approaches and
techniques could not coincidentally be used in a given case.
There are at least two beneficial effects upon practice which may
be anticipated that do not depend upon the nature of the case or the
vested interest of any party to the litigation. First, there should de-
velop greater uniformity of results in terms of statewide practice. It is
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well known to the bar that the strict contributory negligence rule
depended for its practical effect upon the style of the trial judge,
which varied widely not only from judge to judge but from county to
county. In certain counties it has thus been the prevailing practice to
emphasize the literal dictates of the rule in the course of the jury
charge or to vindicate legally the black letter requirements of the rule
in its "pure" form in post trial motions. In yet other counties, the
matter has been treated more gingerly. The use of comparative negli-
gence should lessen this disparity in practice.
More importantly, the proper and judicious use of the compara-
tive negligence rule should facilitate the disposition of claims, ease
the jury's burden in establishing fault, and even enhance public re-
spect for the judicial and adversary processes. Even the occasional
court room participant is aware that comparative negligence has been
in the jury box for years de facto if not de jure. In many, if not most,
cases, "compromise verdict" have simply been the code words for a
comparative negligence finding. The explicit dealing with the com-
parative fault concept in court could not only offer more direction to
the jury but also make it more comfortable to reach a compromise
verdict under clear guidelines. A legal system which recognizes that
an accident may result from more than one source or depend upon
the conduct of more than one individual is bound to generate greater
respect and understanding than the all-or-nothing format which un-
derstandably has sometimes generated extreme offensive and defen-
sive positions. Comparative negligence is a more direct and even
more honest fashion in which to proceed in the disposition of claims
and the trial of cases. Moreover, it serves the integrity of tort law and
tends to protect it from further encroachment by cynical critics.
VI. CONCLUSION
The adoption of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania is con-
sistent with modern social policy and the decided trend in the United
States towards adoption of some form of comparative fault. Because
the Pennsylvania Act does not specifically address certain issues,
however, substantial judicial interpretation is necessary. It is the au-
thors' view that the Act does not particularly alter the law of negli-
gence in Pennsylvania, but only the effect of a plaintiff's contributory
negligence.
For example, the plaintiff's contributory negligence should not
be compared in actions based upon intentional or wanton conduct, or
strict liability, since plaintiff's negligence was not a defense under
prior law. The impact of defendant's conduct in cases such as discov-
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ered peril should also not be changed since the Act provides only that
the plaintiff's negligent conduct shall not be a bar and that his dam-
ages shall be apportioned instead. These issues, however, remain to
be decided definitively by the Pennsylvania courts.
The effect of' the Act upon personal injury practice has already
begun in the areas of evaluation and settlement of claims. Significant
problems remain to be resolved, however, with regard to multiple
defendants, jury instructions, and verdicts. Challenges to counsel in
trial strategy and technique are apparent. Developing case law and
application of the statute in practice hopefully will clarify the broad
spectrum of issues which remain unsettled.
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